

The Pragmatics Impact on Semantics with Reference to Relevance Theorists' Explicatures, and Bach's Implicatures

Assis.Lecturer: Angham Abdul Kadhum Al-Rekaby

College of Education - Al-Qadisiya University

Abstract

For a period of time long enough to be considered, language philosophers, linguists, and scholars think that albeit semantics and pragmatics are two fields concerned with meaning, yet each works in a way that departs from the other. Thus, whereas 'what is said' is the mere field semantics deals with taking into account the truth-conditional meaning of it, pragmatics deals with 'what is implicated' or how it is said only.

For this reason it seems that there is no interface between both. But contemporary pragmatists, although they admit the distinction between semantic and pragmatic meaning, they believe that there is an interface between both, in particular there is a pragmatic impact on the semantic meaning. This impact has been tackled differently by different theorists, linguists, researchers, etc. What distinguishes the present study is that it aims at investigating that impact in relation to two accounts: the relevance theorists' Explicatures and Bach's Implicatures in order to see the relation between both, on the one hand, and in which respect pragmatics influences semantics and how? on the other.

Therefore, it is argued that albeit the outcome of the pragmatics impact on semantics takes different labels, like: explicatures or implicatures, and different types, yet they are roughly similar in different domains and their difference in most cases is a matter of terminology. Consequently, explicatures and implicatures almost lead to similar propositions. Therefore, to certify these hypotheses, the study falls into two parts. It starts with a brief theoretical framework to overview the pragmatics role over the semantic meaning; in particular discussing how the pragmatic elaboration can affect 'what is said' taking into account the relevance theorists' contribution to explore explicatures, and Bach's role in finding out implicatures; and the overlapping between both. The other part displays a practical application of what has been presented theoretically. So, Frank Stockton's short story 'Love Before Breakfast', is analyzed to experience Sperber and Wilson's table of comprehension procedure to arrive at explicatures and implicated conclusions. Then Bach's implicatures are experienced regarding the different types and sub-types of implicatures.

The study concludes that there is a relation between Explicatures and Implicatures in different domains.

1. PRAGMATICS CONTRIBUTION TO SEMANTICS

1.0 Introduction

For many decades semantics and pragmatics were committed to two-fold division between 'what is said' the semantics most concern; and 'what is implicated' the pragmatics concern. Contemporary pragmatics, recently, focuses not only on what is implicated but in addition what is said, i.e., the pragmatics impact on the linguistic meaning. Scholars like, Sperber and Wilson (1986), Carston (1988), Bach (1994) Levinson (2000) and others, concentrate attention on a third layer, the area between what is said, and what is implicated.

Thus, 'explicature', 'implicature', 'unarticulated constituent' and 'default heuristic' are different labels for what goes beyond but related to what is said. The study in question focuses on this area of pragmatics concentration throwing lights on two accounts: Sperber and Wilson's "Relevance theory" and 'Explicature' on the one hand, and Bach's 'Implicature' on the other.

1.1. Pragmatics Contribution to Semantics:

While semantics refers to the aspects of the sentence meaning, which yields the truth conditions of the language by giving full account of the sentence meaning; how these sentences convey information in a context belongs to pragmatics (Katz; 1977:17 and Kempson: 1988:139). So it is the study of the context-dependence sentence meaning, which differs from one context to another (lycan; 1995:587). Fotion (1995:709) manifests that pragmatics departs from reference, truth or grammar; and concentrates on the language users and the context of language use. All the definitions and viewpoints above emphasize the departure of 'what is said' and 'what is implicated', that is, there is no exchangeable relation between semantics and pragmatics.

One of the pivotal aims of the present study is to explore the pragmatics impact on semantics. Accordingly, some approaches like literalism and contextualism consider the gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning, i. e, saying and implicating, a substantial access to deal with pragmatics-semantics distinction. For literalism 'what is said' is determined by some factors: truth-conditional aspects, which are purely linguistically determined, disambiguation and reference resolution. The query raised is: does the linguistic decoding direct the hearer toward what is implicated? From a literalism insight linguistic decoding presents complete account of propositions, and the pragmatic inference is only to identify 'what is implicated', i.e., the speaker's intended meaning (Recanti;2004 a).For illustration consider the following example :

1-I have two pupils now.

by decoding the truth-conditional meaning, disambiguating the word pupil, and assigning the reference of I and now, what is obtained is the literal meaning of the utterance or it is called the proposition expressed. To reach what is implicated the hearer should infer this meaning apart from the linguistic decoding ,i. e , apart from the literal meaning which is the semanticists latent attentiveness,(Sperber and Wilson;2005:6-8). Accordingly, neither semantics contributes to what is implicated nor pragmatics does so to what is said, i.e., neither semantics nor pragmatics adds to each other.

But this is not so for the contextualists, who think that sentence meaning cannot yield full account of proposition unless it is pragmatically elaborated. The proposition expressed is fragmentary and incomplete even when it is treated with truth-conditional aspects or it is disambiguated or even referentially assigned. For instance:

2-That book is difficult.

Even after using all the factors of determining 'what is said' the truth-conditional content -the utterance meaning- is semantically incomplete because there is a need to identify to what that book is difficult, is it to read, to write, to comprehend, to review, to sell, etc.To complete the utterance meaning ,inferential enrichment, to enrich 'what is said' not 'what is implicated' in this process, is required. So "it is more natural...to treat the output of semantics as highly schematic logical form which is fleshed out into fully propositional form by pragmatic inference that go well beyond what is envisaged on a literal approach."(ibid: 10). Consequently, the contextualism approach permits for pragmatic 'intrusion' to semantics

by adding to 'what is said' which is semantically incomplete. The literalism, by contrast, does not permit for such a kind of intrusion for pragmatics affects 'what is implicated' only.

The pragmatic intrusion is highly reinforced by the relevance theorists Sperber and Wilson, who develop the pragmatic intrusion or what they call the 'pragmatic enrichment' for the logical form. Pragmatics, then, contributes considerably to the logical form, i.e., the proposition expressed (for details see 1.3 & 1.5).

1.2 Relevance Theory:

Relevance theory is a proposal by Sperber and Wilson (1986). It is in accordance with the inferential model of linguistic communication that stands against the classical code model. For the latter, the communicator encodes information into signals and decoded by the hearer with another copy of the code. This means, communication is nothing more than encoding one's thoughts into words and decoding these uttered words to be understood. The inferential model sees the communication matter from another angle whereby the communicator communicates a message providing evidence of the meaning intended to be inferred by the hearer depending on the evidence presented. So the hearer, to understand what the speaker means or wants to convey, does not depend on one kind of information provided by the sentence uttered, i.e., the semantic information, rather makes use of all types of information presented until inferring what is intended. (Wikipedia; 2003: 2, Wilson and Sperber; 2004:251, and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2006: 20)

Accordingly, Relevance theory is considered an inferential Pragmatic theory whose aim is to explain how one infers others' meanings according to the kind of the evidence presented. Carston (1999: 87, and 2005: 308) states that Sperber and Wilson aim at a theory of human cognition and communication which is empirical. Hence, they see 'relevance' as a psychological phenomenon basic for the human communication especially for language. Therefore, "utterances raise expectations of relevance ... because the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition, which communicators may exploit." (Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 252). Relevance, then, is the pertinent element this theory relies on. It postulates two related principles: the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative principle (ibid: 1-2).

1.2.1 The Cognitive Principle of Relevance:

To answer a question, to improve one's knowledge on a certain topic, to settle or confirm something, to agree or disagree with someone's viewpoint, etc... an individual needs some background information available in his/her repertoire to make conclusions; without which the processing of an input otherwise, is worthless. A processing of an input is worth when it is relevant to an individual, and to do so Sperber and Wilson (ibid) state the following:

- 1- Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
- 2- Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

Cognitive effects, then, are either positive or false. They are positive when they refer to true conclusions which are deducible neither from the input not from the context alone, but rather from both, for this reason they are worth having. Whereas, false conclusion are not worth having inasmuch as the cognitive effect is important when its input processed contextually, (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 1-2). Moreover, the input is more worthwhile, i.e., is more relevant, when its processing takes less effort, since relevance is a matter of degree.

So there may be some stimuli compete to each other in a context, and all of which suit that context, therefore one is not only to select the stimulus relevant, but, in addition, that which is more relevant than any other alternative input available to an individual that times (Sperber and Wilson;1995:2). Hence, “the greater those positive cognitive effects with the smaller mental effort to get them, the greater the relevance of the input for the individual” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006: 21) the human cognitive system tends automatically to maximize relevance, this leads to the Cognitive Principle of Relevance:

-Human cognition is geared towards the maximization of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; 2002: 2004).

1.2.2 The Communicative Principle of Relevance:

This principle is the background of communications, especially linguistic ones. To make a linguistic communication successful, the communicator requires the hearer's attention, by making the utterance relevant enough to be processed by that hearer. This is what the communicative principle of relevance states:

-Every act of ostensive communication (e.g. an utterance) communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance. (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; 2002: 2004).

Any communication act (inferential communication) will not be successful unless the speaker (the communicator) presents evidence that s/he has an intention to be conveyed. So, inferential communication is a matter of intending to affect other's attention, as well as, a matter of getting them to recognize that intention. This indicates that inferential communication or (ostensive inferential communication, as it is called by the relevance theorists) involves an extra layer of intention:

a. The informative intention:

The intention to inform an audience [a hearer] of something.

b. The communicative intention:

The intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention. (ibid)

Communication, is not a matter of speaker's intending to convey something, rather how to make the hearer notice and recognize that intention, i.e., how to make the hearer comprehend the communicative intention. The communicative intention is the recognizing of the informative intention. The hearer understands the speaker's intension when s/he recognizes the informative intension. Accordingly, what makes a hearer notice the speaker's informative intension is the words uttered, the logical forms which are the pivotal clue to the speaker's intentions. These invoke the hearer's inferential comprehension process (see the discussion of table 1).

Relevance theorists, like Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995, 2002, 2004) and Carston (1988,1999,2004,2005), emphasize that even very explicit content of an utterance one should go beyond what is linguistically encoded. Relevance theorists consider explicit content “as equally inferential, as the recovery of implicatures” (Wilson and Sperber, 2004:253) This leads to what they call explicatures which can be “arrived at by a combination of decoding and inference” opposite to implicatures which are “wholly inferred.” (Wilson and Sperber, 2002: 43)

1.3 Explicature:

The notion of explicature plays a pivotal role in the Relevance theory. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 182) manifest that "a proposition communicated by an utterance is an Explicature if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance", i.e.,

there is a rich elaboration on what is explicitly uttered, that is, pragmatic enrichment. Consider the following examples:

3. I'll bring a bottle to the party.
4. I'm going to sneeze.

As it is mentioned in (1.1) semantics yields fragmentary incomplete propositions (minimal propositions) even after any ambiguities or indexical references are resolved. Therefore, pragmatic enrichment is required. Thus, identifying what is uttered would involve a conceptual structure articulated, which is activated in the hearer's mind via automatic linguistic decoding, i.e., decoding the truth conditional meaning of (3, and 4) involving reference resolution to the indexical 'I'. The truth-conditional meaning should satisfy the pragmatic inferential. So in (3) it is not only an assertion to bring any bottle, rather the speaker will bring a full bottle of alcohol. Additionally, the speaker of (4) does not merely want to express that the sneeze will happen some time in future but rather the sneeze will happen very soon. By the virtue of pragmatic enrichment of the minimal proposition, full communicated proposition will be the result; this is what is called the 'explicature'. Thus, "the truth-conditional [meaning] of an utterance-what the speaker would normally be taken to assert-may go beyond the minimal proposition obtained by decoding, disambiguation and reference assignment" (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 11).

Thereby saying: I'll bring a full bottle of alcohol to the party, and I'm going to sneeze very soon, are full propositions explicitly developed (explicatures). So explicit content is recovered by the decoding of the logical form in addition to the pragmatic inference, whereas, implicit content is recovered inferentially. From a relevance-theoretic perspective, explicit refers to that part of the speaker's meaning not linguistically-encoded, which is part of the explicit truth-conditional meaning. The implicated conclusion, by contrast, refers to that part of the speaker's meaning not linguistically-encoded, which goes well beyond the truth-conditional meaning (ibid).

1.4 Degrees of Explicatures:

Explicatures vary in strength, thus, to identify an explicature a certain amount of inference is required which vary from an utterance to another. "Explicatures may be weaker or stronger, depending on the degree of indeterminacy introduced by the inferential aspect of comprehension" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002: 44). Thereby, explicatures are not of one level in explicitness; consider 4, 5, and 6:

4. I'll bring a bottle to the party.
5. I'll bring a bottle of alcohol to the party.
6. I'll bring a full bottle of alcohol to the party,

all of which represent the same explicature, but they differ in the degree of each one's explicitness, i.e., the amount of inference. The greater amount of inference involved, the weaker explicature will be and the vice versa. Thus, (6) is the most explicit proposition, i.e., least pragmatic intrusion is observed, (5) comes next, and (4) is the least explicit one, i.e., more pragmatic intrusion is involved (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 13).

1.5 Pragmatics Effect on Explicatures:

In fact, pragmatic inference substantially contributes to both explicatures and implicated conclusions. Linguistically-encoded meaning gives raise to schematic indication of the speaker's meaning. This indication in addition to background knowledge or information (contextual assumption) is used to interpret the speaker's meaning. In relevance-theoretic terms, during the process of comprehension guided by the comprehension heuristic "follow a

path of least effort in computing cognitive: test interpretive hypothesis in order of accessibility, and stop when your expectation of relevance satisfied.” (Wilson and Sperber, 2004:259), a hearer will raise relevant specific expectations, i.e., (the implicated premises to deduce the implicated conclusions). This can be summarized by the following sub-tasks:

1. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about...explicatures via decoding, disambiguation reference resolution, and pragmatic enrichment processes.
 2. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (in relevance-theoretic terms, Implicated premises).
 3. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (in relevance-theoretic terms, Implicated conclusions).
- (Wilson and Sperber, 2004:261)

The hearer comprehends the speaker’s meaning at once, and automatically, which makes these sub-tasks work parallelly not according to sequential order. Consequently, “Comprehension is an on-line process, and hypothesis about explicatures, implicated premises and implicated conclusion are developed in parallel, against a background of explications which may be revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 14-15)

Thus, the implicated conclusion is the result of the combination of the intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises) together with explicit premises, i.e., explicatures.

Consider, for example, the following exchange between Jones and Lisa

7-a- Allan Jones: Do you want to join us for supper?

7-b- Lisa: No, thanks. I’ve eaten.

According to Lisa’s answer, the following contextual assumptions (implicated premises) can be supplied, in relation to the encyclopedic information related to the concept of EATING:

8-a- People don’t normally want to eat supper twice in one evening.

8-b- The fact that one has already eaten supper on a given evening is a good reason for refusing an invitation to supper that evening.

It is seen that the linguistically-encoded meaning is pragmatically enriched to represent the following explicature:

9- Lisa has already eaten supper on the evening of utterance.

By the virtue of gathering both the implicated premises and the explicature, the following likely implicated conclusion can be obtained:

10- Lisa is refusing his invitation because she has already had supper that evening, and she might accept such a kind of invitation another time, etc....

The whole process of comprehension is summarized, by Wilson and Sperber (2002), displaying a certain table with which the hearer’s interpretive hypotheses is put on the left side of the table, and the basis for arriving at these hypotheses on the other. Consider the example:

11-a- Peter: Did John payback the money he owed you?

b- Mary: No, He forgot to go to the Bank.

Peter is likely to interpret and comprehend Mary’s reply by the virtue of using the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure in order to make (as it is shown in table (1) below) some hypotheses about the explicature and the implicated conclusion of this utterance (Wilson and Sperber, 2004:263).

(a) Mary has said to Peter, "He forgot to go to the BANK1 / BANK 2." [He = uninterpreted pronoun] [BANK 1 = financial institution] [BANK 2 = river bank]	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Mary's utterance into a description of Mary's ostensive behaviour.
(b) Mary's utterance will be optimally relevant to Peter.	Expectation raised by recognition of Mary's ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the presumption of relevance it conveys.
(c) Mary's utterance will achieve relevance by explaining why John has not repaid the money he owed her.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Peter at this point.
(d) Forgetting to go to the BANK1 may make one unable to repay the money one owes.	First assumption to occur to Peter which, together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Mary's utterance.
(e) John forgot to go to the BANK1.	First enrichment of the logical form of Mary's utterance to occur to Peter which might combine with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Mary's utterance.
(f) John was unable to repay Mary the money he owes because he forgot to go to the BANK1.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Mary's utterance.
(g) John may repay Mary the money he owes when he next goes to the BANK1.	From (f) plus background knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Mary's utterance which, together with (f), satisfy expectation (b).

Table (1)

1.6 Implicature:

Bach (1994 a) puts forth the term *Implicature* which is distinct but overlaps with the relevance theorists' -Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Carston (1988) - term *explicature*. *Implicature* refers to "something that is built from what the speaker says in uttering the sentence," (Bach; 1994 a: 5). Thereby, *implicatures* go beyond what is said but they are not *implicatures*. "They represent a middle ground between explicit content and *implicature*" (ibid: 10). This goes in accordance with Garrett and Harnish's definition of *implicature* (2007:66), stating that *implicature* refers to "the communication of information not explicitly contained in the words uttered ... i.e., something between linguistic meaning and speaker's meaning". All things considered above, harden the difference between *implicatures* and what is *implicated* (*implicature*); for example when saying:

12- Mary has a boyfriend.

The *implicature*, which is built up explicitly, could be:

13- Mary has one boyfriend.

Whereas, what is *implicated*, which is implied in what is said depending on different circumstances, is not just to state (13), rather to *implicate*, for example, that Mary is not lesbian, or she is getting a divorce or she will, etc.

Thus, what is *implicated* refers to additional proposition external to what is said. What is *implicit* (*implicature*) is *implicitly* determined by the explicit content but it will not be

explicit unless it is conceptually strengthened, i.e. enriched, to be fully explicit, (Bach; 1994 a: 11).

Accordingly, it sounds that explicatures and implicatures are two competing concepts to represent the same phenomenon, but Bach (2004: 5) points out some differences between both stating that, part of what is explicitly expressed is implicit and this is not in accordance with the term explicature because “to explicate something is to spell it out, and to spell out the explicature of an utterance would be to make fully explicit what has in fact been left partly implicit” (ibid). Therefore, Bach uses implicature to refer to the implicit part of the explicit content keeping in one’s mind that implicature does not suggest that all of which is implicit.

The other distinction is, while relevantists do not bother themselves with the explicature types because, for them, the utterances in general present fragmentary, incomplete propositions, Bach on the other side does so. He distinguishes two types of implicature; one in which the utterance semantically leaves out a conceptual information, therefore something should be added to decide whether it is true or false. This type is called completion, whereby the fragmentary propositional is filled in. The other type is to expand a complete proposition. The proposition is already true or false, i.e., “with expansion a complete but skeletal proposition is fleshed out” (Bach, 1994 a: 2-19).

1.6.1 Completion:

Regarding what is stated above, there are some sentences although well-formed syntactically, they are semantically ill-formed in the sense that they fail to yield complete propositions even after the fixedness of indexical expressions or the resolution of ambiguous expressions. Therefore, they should be inserted by some constituents to display complete propositions. Such a kind of sentences were called semantic generality (Atlas; 1977) or non specificity (Bach; 1982) but nowadays it is widely known as semantic under-determination .Consider the following illustrations.

14. That lamp is cheap.
15. Strom is too old.
16. Mutual knowledge is relevant.
17. Even cowgirls sing the blues.
18. She almost finished the contract.

All of the above examples are well-formed syntactically, even so, full propositions are not determined, i.e., truth conditions are not firm. What is determined is only a propositional radical (as it is called by Bach; 1994). Thus (14) needs to state the cheapness is relative to what? (15) Strom is too old to or for what? (16) The knowledge is relevant to what? And (17) cowgirls in addition to whom or what? These four examples require to be filled in, in a way or another by certain conceptual materials, to be:

- 19-That lamp is cheap. [relative to other lamps]
- 20-Strom is too old. [to be a good senator]
- 21-Mutual knowledge is relevant. [to communication]
- 22-Even cowgirls sing the blues. [in addition to cowboys]

Whereas, (18) because of the word (almost), seems different from the above examples. What is communicated could be: she tried and nearly finished the contract, or at last she felt reluctant to do it, etc. What is required is not a conceptual material rather there is a requirement to state the "structural relations among existing materials"(Bach; 1994 a: 3)

Semantic underdetermination can take different forms like:

1-Referential underdetermination

-indexical, demonstrative

23 -SHE will be here soon. (Which female?)

24 -THIS guy is dangerous. (what demonstrated guy?)

25 - John went to the store. (when?)

26 -Bill is STILL complaining. (since when?) -anaphoric

27-Bob told Bill to polish HIS shoes. (Bob's/Bill's)

28 -Hillary loves her husband, and SO does Tipper. (loves Tipper's/Hillary's husband) (Bach; 1994:20-21)

2 -phrasal underdetermination (not syntactic ambiguity)

29-George ALMOST killed the goose. (he refrained/he missed/it survived)

3-argumental underdetermination

30-Gentlemen PREFER blondes (to what?)

31-Marilyn is TOO tall/not short ENOUGH. (for what?)

32-Mutual knowledge is not RELEVANT. (to what?)

33-John is READY/LATE/EAGER. (to or for what?)

34-A mop is NEEDED to dry the floor. (for what?) (ibid)

4-parametric underdetermination

35-That lamp is SHORT/CHEAP/OLD. (relative to what?)

36-That employee is GOOD/TALENTED/VALUABLE. (in what respect?)

37-EVEN cowgirls sing the blues. (in addition to who?)

38-Gregor was MERELY a bookkeeper. (as opposed to what?)

39-John WANTS a car/a taxi/a sandwich/a woman/a massage/a bath. (to do what with?), (ibid)

1.6.2. Expansion:

If one consider the following sentences:

40- You are not going to die. (the mother talks to her injured kid)

41- France is hexagonal.

42- Andrew weighed 500 pounds.

S/he will immediately state that each one of which yields a complete proposition, that is, there is no need to insert certain constituent to complete it. Yet, they are minimal propositions as it is stated by Bach, not necessarily in their logical or informational content, but rather in their “departure from the meaning of the sentence” (Bach; 1994 a: 20-21). Bach calls them ‘skeletal proposition’ (ibid). Such a kind of sentences, even when none of their constituents are being used figuratively, are used none literally, which is common but is not very recognized. Therefore, when saying:

43- Barak is too young to be the President of the USA.

This example yields a full proposition, yet it is not fully explicit. It is not semantically under determinate because it is already completed. The speaker uses each of his/her words literally but omits certain conceptual constituents that could have made the sentence uttered fully explicit. If the hearer understands this utterance as that Barak is not a mature man, it would not because the speaker’s utterance is opaque, but may be the hearer is not in the suitable context to get what the speaker means. This example illustrates nonliterality not because the word young is used figuratively, but “it is a way of not being literal” (Bach; 1994 a: 20-21) what the speaker means is closely related but not identical to what is said. Thus, (22) could be intended to be expanded by the insertion of conceptual material to be:

Barak is too young (as regard all the ex American Presidents) to be the President of the USA. (ibid and Bach; 2000:2-8)

The expansion may take different forms like:

1-implicit quantifier domains

44-I have always [since early childhood] liked spinach.

2-implicit qualifications

45-I will be there [at the appointed time].

46-George went to the store [intentionally].

47-Jack and Jill are married [to each other].

3-approximation

48-There are [more or less] 30 students per class.

49-Berkeley is [about] 10 miles from San Francisco.

4-precisification

50-He has [exactly] three cars. (Bach; 1994:21-22)

2. The Analysis:

Two basic levels and some other sub-levels are taken into account in the following analysis. The first one namely takes into account Sperber and Wilson's table of the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure to arrive at, basically, explicatures and the implicated conclusions of a speaker's utterances. The other level concentrates on Bach's classifications for implicatures regarding the sub-classification of both, semantic underdetermination and expansion.

The extracts analyzed are adopted from Frank Stockton's short story 'Love Before Breakfast', depending on some conversations between the characters of that story.

Extract (1)

When Miss Vincent, Cora, came out to tell Mr. Ripley, the owner of the place, that her parents decided to take the place which they think they will enjoy their time there "It is so different from anything we have yet seen" (App. 1: 29). The process by which Ripley interprets Cora's utterance can be represented as in table (1).

1a/ Cora has said to Ripley, ' It is so different from anything we have yet seen.' It = uninterpreted pronoun anything = any place (house) we = uninterpreted pronoun	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Cora's utterance into a description of Cora's ostensive behaviour.
b/ Cora's utterance will be optimally relevant to Ripley.	Expectation raised by recognition of Cora's ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c/ Cora's utterance will achieve relevance by explaining why she feels glad and expects to enjoy their time in staying at Ripley's place.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Ripley at that point.
d/ Finding a suitable, comfortable and enjoyable place is a good reason to make one feels happy and glad.	First assumption, to occur to Ripley which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Cora's utterance.
e) Ripley's place is better than any other	First enrichment of the logical form of

place Cora and her parents have seen before.	Cora's utterance to occur to Ripley which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Cora's utterance.
f/ Cora and her parents are glad for finding Ripley's place which is much better than any other place they have seen before.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Cora's utterance.
g/ The Vincents may hire the place.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Cora's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (1)

Table (1) above displays the process by which Ripley comprehends Cora's utterance in order to make some hypotheses of the explicatures and the implicit conclusions of the utterance in question. Ripley assumes that Cora's utterance decoded in (1a), is optimally relevant to him in (b), since what he wants to know is her opinion about his place. He assumes in (c) that this utterance will achieve relevance by stating her opinion about that place. The contextual assumption in (d) (that people feel happy and glad when finding a suitable, comfortable, and enjoyable place after a long searching) which is presented by the logical form of the situation described, is considered the implicit premise in deriving the expected explanation of Cora's behaviour, provided that the utterance is interpreted on the explicit side (by the virtue of reference assignment and disambiguation) as conveying the information in (c): that Ripley's place is much better than any place Cora and her parents have seen before. By gathering the implicit premise in (d) and the explicit premise in (e), which is the explicature of Cora's utterance, Ripley may recognize the implicit conclusion in (f) which can be developed to make further weak implicit conclusions as in (g). The process of comprehension explained above depends on the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.

Similarly, Bach (1994) (see 1.5) distinct some types for implicatures. It is obvious that Cora's utterance because of the word 'different' fails to yield full proposition, it is a propositional radical, i.e., it cannot determine definite truth conditions. There is, then, semantic underdetermination which means there is a requirement to identify the relations among existing materials. Therefore, Cora's statement 'It is so different...' 'different' in which sense? Is it positive or negative? Since it is preceded by feelings of happiness and enjoyment, this utterance may be pragmatically enriched to infer missing constituents like: better, much more comfortable etc. Thus, the implicature of Cora's utterance, after reference resolution of the indexical words and pragmatic enrichment, is likely to be:

- Ripley's place (house) is better from any other places Cora and her parents have ever seen before.

Extract (2):

When Barker, the agent of landed properties, advises Ripley to withdraw the agreement between him and the Vincents because the rent is so much less than what one could get for such a place. Ripley severely refuses, asserting "These Vincents exactly suit me." (App. 1: 30).

2a- Ripley has said to Barker, 'These Vincents exactly Suit 1 /Suit 2 me.' me = uninterpreted pronoun	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Ripley's utterance into a description of Ripley's
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suit 1 = to look attractive on somebody suit 2 = to be convenient or suitable	ostensive behaviour.
b- Ripley's utterance will be optimally relevant to Barker	Expectation raised by recognition of Ripley's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c- Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by giving the reasons why he does not want to withdraw the agreement between him and the Vincents.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Barker at that point.
d. The Vincents being suitable to Ripley is a good reason for not withdrawing the agreement.	First assumption, to occur to Barker which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Ripley's utterance.
e- Miss Vincent and her parents not other tenants Suit 2 Ripley.	First enrichment of the logical form of Ripley's utterance to occur to Barker which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Ripley's utterance.
f- Ripley does not want to withdraw the agreement between him and the Vincents because they are exactly the tenants suite him.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Ripley's utterance.
g- Ripley may search for a chance to talk to Miss Vincent (Cora).	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Ripley's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (2)

Barker constructs some hypotheses to comprehend Ripley's utterance 'These Vincents exactly Suit 2 me'. This utterance which is decoded in (2a) is optimally relevant to Barker inasmuch as he wants to know Ripley's reasons behind not withdrawing the agreement between him and the Vincents. By knowing the reasons as in (d), Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance as it is assumed in (c). So, being suitable to Ripley which is the reason behind not withdrawing the agreement is considered the implicit premise to find out explanation of Ripley's behaviour. After pragmatic elaboration accompanied with needed disambiguation and reference resolution, Ripley's utterance explicitly interpreted by Barker (explicit premise) to represent the explicature of this utterance as in (e). The implicit and the explicit premises in (d) and (e) respectively, together will make Barker reaches the implicit conclusion in (f) which may lead to some other further implicit conclusions as in (g).

'These Vincents exactly suit me', yields incomplete proposition, though syntactically well-formed. With this utterance there is a need to know suit him for what. Therefore to depend on the conventional meaning only, the results will not be satisfied because to arrive at full proposition, there should be pragmatic elaboration to insert the required conceptual material to determine the definite truth-conditions of that proposition. Then, this utterance is semantically underdeterminate of argumental kind. After the process of completion to supply the missing portion of what is expressed explicitly the implicature is likely to be:

-Miss Vincent and her parents exactly suit Ripley to hire his place.

In addition the resulting full proposition can be expanded involving conceptual strengthening. The word (exactly) expresses precisification, can be expended to make the utterance:

-Miss Vincent and her parents the only tenants suit Ripley to hire his place.

Consequently, it is observed that the two types of implicature: completion and expansion are represented in the utterance above, but the process can not be made unless the utterance completed first.

Extract (3)

Ripley prefers to have the rent all at once, so he tells Barker not to go every month to the Vincents to collect it. He asserts "I would much prefer to have money in a lump when I come back." "(App. 1: 30).

<p>3a- Ripley has said to Barker, 'I would much prefer to Have1/Have2/Have3/Have4 the money in a Lump1, Lump2/ Lump3/ when I come back.'</p> <p>I = uninterpreted pronoun lump1 = a piece of something solid of any size or shape. lump2 = a hard swelling on or in the body lump3 = an amount of money paid all at once. have 1 = to own or possess have 2 = to ill with something have 3 = to talk about doing something have 4 = to receive</p>	<p>Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Ripley's utterance into a description of Ripley's ostensive behavior.</p>
<p>b- Ripley's utterance will be optimally relevant to Barker.</p>	<p>Expectation raised by recognition of Ripley's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.</p>
<p>c- Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by explaining why Ripley does not want Barker to collect the rent every month.</p>	<p>Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Barker at that point.</p>
<p>d- Preferring to have the rent in a lump is a good reason for preventing the agent responsible to collect it every month</p>	<p>First assumption, to occur to Barker which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Ripley's utterance.</p>
<p>e- Ripley prefers to have 4 the money of the rent of his house in a lump when he comes back from Europe.</p>	<p>First enrichment of the logical form of Ripley's utterance to occur to Barker which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Ripley's utterance.</p>
<p>f- Ripley does not want Barker to collect the rent every month because he prefers to have the money of the rent in a lump3 when he comes</p>	<p>Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Ripley's utterance.</p>

back from Europe.	
g- Ripley may want to make some decorations or improvement in his house making use of that sum.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Ripley's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (3)

As it is shown in table (3) and according to the relevance-theoretic process of comprehension, Barker decodes Ripley's utterance as in (a) which is optimally relevant to him as in (b) by giving explanation why Ripley does not want him to collect the money every month as in (d), the utterance is assumed to achieve relevance in (c) preferring to have the rent in a lump may prevent the agent responsible from collecting money every month. This reason could be considered the implicit premise for Ripley's utterance. After resolving any ambiguities or indexical references, in addition to the pragmatic elaboration the explicit premise (explicature) will be represented as in (e). By combining these premises: the implicit in (d) and the explicit in (e), Barker may arrive at the implicit conclusions in (f) as well as (g). The interpretation Barker reaches should satisfy his expectation about Ripley's utterance, to consider, his utterance relevance.

The implicature of Ripley's utterance 'I would much prefer to have the money in a lump when I come back' is because of semantic underdetermination so completion is required to express a complete and determinate proposition. Thus in Ripley's utterance above there is a require first to know he prefers to have the money of what? Second to know to have that money in lump rather than what? and third he comes back from what? The semantic underdetermination of all these is argumental. Depending on the pragmatic inference by adding the conceptual material required, the utterance will be fully explicit and it will succeed to yield full proposition to decide whether it is true or false. Thus, the implicature of Ripley's utterance is likely to be:

- Ripley would much prefer to have the money of the rent in a lump than to collect it every month when he comes back from Europe.

Extract (4):

When Ripley expresses his desire to have the money in a lump Barker argues against saying "but that's not the way to do business" (App. 1: 30).

4.a- Barker has said to Ripley, 'but that's not the way to do business' that = uninterpreted pronoun	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Barker's utterance into a description of Barker's ostensive behaviour.
b- Barker's utterance will be optimally relevant to Ripley.	Expectation raised by recognition of Barker's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c- Barker's utterance will achieve its relevance by stating why Barker is against Ripley's desire to have money in a lump	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Ripley at that

	point.
d- Being away from what is usual and common to do business of something is a good reason to make the one responsible against that thing.	First assumption, to occur to Ripley which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Barker's utterance.
e- Barker thinks that to have the money in a lump is not the common procedure to do business of hiring houses.	First enrichment of the logical form of Barker's utterance to occur to Ripley which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Barker's utterance.
f- Barker is against Ripley's desire to have the money in a lump because this is not the common procedure to do business of hiring houses.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Barker's utterance.
g- Barker may succeed in changing Ripley's mind.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Barker's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (4)

Table (4) outlines that the utterance above decoded in (a) is assumed in (b) by Ripley to be optimally relevant. This utterance is hypothesized in (c) to have relevance by asserting the reasons why Barker thinks that Ripley's desire is against the norms of doing business as in (d). (d): being away from the common procedure of doing business of hiring houses is the implicit premise which can be added to the explicit premise (explicature) in (e) resulting the implicit conclusions in (f) and some other further and weaker conclusions as in (g) which should satisfy Ripley's expectations of relevance.

Barker utterance "but that's not the way to do business" does not determine complete proposition, i.e., there is a semantic underdetermination. There are two types of underdetermination the first because of the demonstrative 'that', that is, referential underdetermination in which there is a necessity to determine 'that' demonstrates what? Second, there is an argumental semantic underdetermination because there is a requisite to know to do the business of what? Therefore, a conceptual material should be added to make the propositional radical of Barker's full. Thus, the utterance after pragmatic enrichment is likely to be:

- but to have money in a lump is not the way to do business of hiring houses.

Even after the process of completion, the resulting proposition is minimal because of sentence nonliterality. So by saying 'that's not the way to do business' Barker does not mean it literally, he does not want to communicate that Ripley innovates new way to business, rather what can be pragmatically inferred is that he wants to communicate that this is not the common way. The implicature of this utterance can be processed to be expanded to be:

- but to have money in a lump is not the [common] way to do business of hiring houses.

So, the implicature of his utterance is because of the semantic underdeterminate which is treated first, as well as the expansion of the proposition expressed.

Extract (5):

Cora feels, by hiring Ripley's house, that they will deprive him from his rights. She comments "you are so fond of your house and everything you have." (App. 1: 31).

5a- Cora has said to Ripley, 'you are so fond of your house and everything you have1/Have2/Have3/Have4.' you = uninterpreted pronoun have1 = to own or possess have2 = to be ill with something have3 = to talk about doing something have4 = to get or receive something	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Cora's utterance into a description of Cora's ostensive behaviour.
b- Cora's utterance will be optimally relevant to Ripley	Expectation raised by recognition of Cora's ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c- Cora's utterance will achieve relevance by giving reasons why she feels that they will deprive Ripley from his rights.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Ripley at that point.
d- One being sticking and attached to some place and everything s/he has there is a good reason to make the tenants of that place feel that they deprive him/her from their rights.	First assumption, to occur to Ripley which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Cora's utterance.
e- Ripley is so fond of his house and everything he has1	First enrichment of the logical form of Cora's utterance to occur to Ripley which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Cora's utterance.
f- Cora feels that she and her parents deprive Ripley from his rights because Ripley is so fond of his house and everything he has1 there.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Cora's utterance.
g. Cora may think that Ripley does not have the real desire to let his house.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Cora's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (5)

The explicature in (e) arrived at by Ripley is due to the procedure of comprehension, whereby Cora's utterance which is decoded in (a) Ripley assumes achieve it relevance by putting reasons for Cora's feeling of depriving Ripley from his right, as in (d). (d) [One being sticking to and so fond of his place and everything one has there] represents the implicit premise of Cora's utterance which in order to arrive at the implicit conclusion in (f) should be

accompanied with the explicit premise in 9e). Similarly, some further implicit conclusion as in (g).

The implicature of Cora's utterance 'you are so fond of your house and everything you have' is due to argumental semantic underdetermination, and unless it is elaborated pragmatically, even after any references and ambiguities are resolved, a complete proposition would not be achieved. Thus, this utterance requires identifying where these things Ripley has. So, the implicature of Cora's utterance is likely to be:

- Mr. Ripley is so fond of his house and everything he has there (at his house, or relative to it).

Extract (6):

In certain morning when Cora met Ripley, he supposed that she must be surprised to see him, adding "you supposed I was in Europe"" (App. 1: 32).

6-a- Ripley has said to Cora, 'you supposed I was in Europe' you = uninterpreted pronoun I = uninterpreted pronoun	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Ripley's utterance into a description of Ripley's ostensive behavior.
b- Ripley's utterance is optimally relevant to Cora	Expectation raised by recognition of Ripley's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c- Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by stating why he supposed Cora surprised to see him.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Cora at that point.
d- One supposed to be abroad during a certain period of time may be a good reason to make others surprised to that person then.	First assumption, to occur to Cora which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Ripley's utterance.
e- Ripley thinks that Cora supposed he was in Europe.	First enrichment of the logical form of Ripley's utterance to occur to Cora which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Ripley's utterance.
f- Ripley is supposed that Cora is surprised to see him in his land because she supposed him in Europe.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Ripley's utterance.
g- Ripley is afraid that Cora may misunderstand his presence in the land he let to her family	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Ripley's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (6)

Table (6) mirrors Cora's perception of Ripley's meaning. So, Ripley's utterance which is optimally relevant to Cora in (b) is linguistically decoded in (a). Since Cora wants to know why Ripley supposed her to be surprised to see him, she assumes that his utterance will achieve relevance in (c) by presenting an explanation to that inquiry. In this situation an easy access to the piece of background knowledge in (d) can be presented by the logical form of Ripley's utterance 'you supposed I was in Europe'. Therefore, the contextual assumption in (d) [people normally do not expect to see the person who is supposed to be abroad at that time] could be the implicit premise to present an expected explanation to Ripley's utterance. This implicit premise can be accompanied with the explicit premise in (e) to derive the implicit conclusion in (f) and other weaker conclusions as in (g) or more other conclusions. Therefore, the explicit premise in (e) [Cora supposed Ripley traveled to Europe] represents the explicature of Ripley's utterance.

According to Bach's explanation of implicature, Ripley's utterance 'you supposed I was in Europe' is not in need of the insertion of conceptual material, rather conceptual strengthening is demanded, i.e., it requires an expansion because it represents full proposition. The importance of the expansion lies not in identifying the exact words the speaker thinks of, but how certain words may contribute to the uttered sentence (see 1.5.2 and Bach, 2004: 7). Therefore, Ripley's utterance after resolving the indexical references or ambiguities needed, is pragmatically elaborated to be likely:- Cora supposed Ripley was in Europe for the time being.

Extract (7):

In a certain encounter between Ripley and Cora, Ripley begged Cora's pardon for being in the land he let to then, she replied that people didn't trespass on their lands. But he, in this context, comments saying: "But it is not my land. It is your father's for the time being." (App. 1: 32).

<p>7-a- Ripley has said to Cora, 'But it is not my Land1/Land2/Land3/Land4. It is your father's for the time being.'</p> <p>It = uninterpreted pronoun land1 = the solid part of the surface of the earth. land2 = a piece of ground land3 = ground, soil or earth of a particular kind land4 = a country, home, etc.</p>	<p>Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Ripley's utterance into a description of Ripley's ostensive behavior.</p>
<p>b- Ripley utterance will be optimally relevant to Cora.</p>	<p>Expectation raised by recognition of Ripley's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.</p>
<p>c- Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by explaining why he considers himself trespasser in his Land4</p>	<p>Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Cora at that point.</p>
<p>d- Entering the Land4 which is let without taking permission from the tenants, is a good reason to make one, even the owner, consider it a matter of trespass.</p>	<p>First assumption, to occur to Cora which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of</p>

	Ripley's utterance.
e- Ripley considers the land is not his own, it is Mr. Vincent's for the present.	First enrichment of the logical form of Ripley's utterance to occur to Cora which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Ripley's utterance.
f- Ripley considers himself trespasser he enters the Land he lets for Mr. Vincent for the time being without taking permission.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Ripley's utterance.
g- Ripley may not enter his land until the period of hiring the land is finished.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Ripley's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (7)

The explicature in (e) Cora arrives at due to comprehension procedure whereby she constructs hypotheses about Ripley's meaning by uttering 'But it is not my land. It is your father's for the time being' This utterance which is logically decoded as in (a), is optimally relevant to Cora as it is assumed in (b). Since what Cora wants to know in this context is why Ripley considers himself trespasser in his own land, the answering of this inquiry will make Ripley's utterance obtain relevance as it is assumed in (c). In this context, the logical form of Ripley's utterance can lead to the intended contextual assumption in (d) that [people normally cannot enter the place they let without taking the permission of the tenants]. The contextual assumption- the implicit premise- together with the explicit one in (e) which is arrived at via disambiguation, reference resolution together with pragmatic enrichment, may lead to the implicit conclusions in (f) or others weaker as in (g).

To arrive at the implicature of the second part of Ripley's utterance 'It is your father's for the time being' there is a requirement for inserting conceptual material to clarify why Ripley thinks it is not his own land, so the proposition yielded is not full. The proposition after reference assignment and needed disambiguation will be likely:

- This land is roughly Mr. Vincent's the time being because Ripley lets it for him for.

Still, this proposition is minimal; it should be conceptually strengthened, i.e., pragmatically reinforced, rather than logical one. Thus, the process of expansion in this case, which is to approximate Ripley's utterance, is redundant since Cora has already perceived it, to be:

- This land [roughly speaking] is Mr. Vincent's for the time being because Ripley lets it for him.

Extract (8):

When Cora did not really know why Ripley did not go to Europe, he comments "I do not wish to be away, I want to come here and live here always" (App. 1: 33).

8-a- Ripley has said to Cora, 'I do not wish to be away; I want to come here and live here always' I = uninterpreted pronoun here = uninterpreted pronoun	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Ripley's utterance into a description of Ripley's ostensive behavior.
b- Ripley's utterance will be optimally relevant	Expectation raised by recognition of

to Cora.	Ripley's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c- Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by stating why he did not go to Europe.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Cora at that point.
d- Being attached to some place is a good reason not to leave it or to be away from it at all.	First assumption, to occur to Cora which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Ripley's utterance.
e- Ripley does not wish to be away from his land and wants to come and live there for ever.	First enrichment of the logical form of Ripley's utterance to occur to Cora which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Ripley's utterance.
f- Ripley does not go to Europe, because he is attached to his land, so he does not wish to be there and wants to come and live there for ever.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Ripley's utterance.
g- Ripley may want to see Cora every day so he does not want to be away.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Ripley's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (8)

Since what Cora wants to know is why Ripley does not go to Europe, she assumes in (c) that his utterance, which is decoded in (a) and optimally relevant to her in (b), will obtain relevance by answering her question. In this situation, the logical form 'I do not want to be away, I want to come here and live here always.' is a good access to the encyclopedic information in (d) [that being very attached to one's land is a good reason not to be away or to leave it at all]. This common background knowledge can be used as the implicit premise which gives rise together with the explicature in (e), to the implicit conclusion in (f) and also Cora may extend these conclusions in away it suits her expectations of relevance as in (g).

Ripley's utterance "I do not wish to be away; I want to come here and live here always." is considered two parts. The implicature of the first part 'I do not wish to be away' is due to incomplete proposition because it requires inserting the constituent away from what? After resolving ambiguities or indexical reference it will represent full proposition, i.e., true or false. Thus, the utterance is likely to be:

- Ripley does not wish to be away from his land.

Therefore, the above utterance suffers argumental semantic underdetermination that is why it needs the process of completion. In addition this proposition can be expanded to indicate implicit qualification to be:

- Ripley [intentionally] does not wish to be away from his land.

In contrast to the first part of Ripley's utterance, the second part 'I want to come here and to live here always' yields full proposition but it is minimal, not because it is logically

incomplete rather because it goes away from the sentence meaning. There is a need for expansion which is raised from the nonliteral use of the lexical word 'always'. Therefore, 'always' cannot be used to express immortality but it is likely to be used to express till the end of one's life. So the expansion version, which belongs to implicit quantifier domain, of this utterance is likely to be:

- Ripley wants to come in his land and live there till the end of his life.

Besides, to express the precisification of this proposition it can be expanded to be:

- Ripley [exactly] wants to come in his land and live there till the end of his life.

Then, the implicature of Ripley's utterance can be represented as follows:

- Ripley [intentionally] does not wish to be away from his land and he [exactly] wants to come in his land and live there till the end of his life.

Extract (9):

When Cora invited Ripley to have breakfast with her family, his utterance "They would be so surprised" immediately follows his refusal of Cora's invitation. "(App. 1: 34).

9-a- Ripley has said to Cora, 'They would be so surprised They = uninterpreted pronoun	Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical form of Ripley's utterance into a description of Ripley's ostensive behavior.
b- Ripley's utterance will be optimally relevant to Cora.	Expectation raised by recognition of Ripley's ostensive behavior and acceptance of the presumptive of relevance it conveys.
c- Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by giving explanation about his refusal of Cora's invitation to breakfast.	Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Cora at that point.
d- One being shocked to see someone supposed to be away for the time being could be an acceptable explanation to make that person refuse an invitation for breakfast.	First assumption, to occur to Cora which together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Ripley's utterance.
e- Ripley thinks that the Vincents would be so surprised to see him.	First enrichment of the logical form of Ripley's utterance to occur to Cora which might contribute with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Ripley's utterance.
f- Ripley refuses to have breakfast with Cora's family because he thinks they would be so surprised to see him during a period of time he supposed to be away.	Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Ripley's utterance.
g- Ripley may accept an invitation of Cora's to breakfast another time.	From (f) plus background and knowledge. One of several possible weak implicatures of Ripley's utterance which, together with (f) satisfy expectation (b).

Table (9)

Ripley's utterance 'They would be so surprised' linguistically decoded in (a) is assumed in (b) to be optimally relevant to Cora. Cora assumes in (c) that Ripley's utterance will achieve relevance by presenting the reasons of refusing the invitation as in (d). (d) [People normally get shocked to see someone supposed to be away during a certain period of time] is considered the intended contextual assumption, i.e., it is the implicit premise of Ripley's utterance. This premise together with the explicit one in (e) may open the way to some implicit conclusions (implicatures) as in (f) which is the strongest one, or others as in (g). This interpretation satisfies Ripley's expectations and hypotheses of relevance.

As regards the implicature of Ripley's utterance 'They would be so surprised' one needs to know surprised because of what? That is, it is argumental semantic underdetermination. Thus, there is no possibility to decide whether this utterance is true or false because it yields fragmentary proposition that should be filled in. Conceptual material, obtained by the virtue of pragmatic enrichment should be added to that utterance to make it full. Such a pragmatic elaboration in this case adds to the logical form, that is, what is explicitly expressed. Later another pragmatic inference will add to what is implicated. Hence, after the process of completion as well as the resolving of any needed ambiguities or indexical references, the implicature of Ripley's utterance is likely to be:

- Cora's parents would be so surprised to see Ripley.

Now, this utterance yields full proposition, yet it should be fleshed out because the proposition communicated is logically weak since there is no explanation why the seeing of Ripley shocks Cora's parents. This utterance, then, needs a conceptual strengthening to be likely:

- Cora's parents would be so surprised to see Ripley during a period of time he supposed to be away.

The type of the expansion in this case belongs to implicit qualification kind.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1- It is evident that the difference between explicatures and implicatures in most cases is merely a terminological one, this validates the hypothesis that explicatures and implicatures are roughly similar in different domains .
- 2- It is palpable that the propositions resulted whether explicatures or implicatures are approximately similar especially those of the semantic underdetermination; this validates the hypothesis that the explicatures and implicatures almost lead to similar propositions
- 3-Whereas relevance theorists emphasize that an explicature is a result of no more than decoding and developing a logical form encoded by an utterance, Bach emphasizes that an implicature in addition to what is stated above, could be a result of conceptual strengthening , regarding the utterances that are normally used to convey more precise propositions.
- 4- The relevance theory presents an excellent explanation for the comprehension procedure.
- 5- Since the process of comprehension highly depends on the background information shared by the interlocutors, it is observed that most of the extracts analyzed above are semantically underdeterminate. This means that the speaker wants the hearer to read the missing conceptual material or to indicate the relation with in the existed elements into his/her utterance using that background knowledge, i.e., there is no need to state it in full.
- 6- In many cases of expansion it is observed that the process of expansion is superfluous.

7-One can see flexibility with expansion more than with completion process since the truth –condition of the proposition of the latter can not be determined unless it is filled in, whereas the one of the former is full.

8- Relevance theorists believe in the incompleteness of all propositions, therefore all of which should be filled in to be true or false .Bach, by contrast, believes that the incompleteness of propositions is not something absolute inasmuch as some are full, still they are minimal but not logical rather because they are usually exploited to indicate more elaboration and specific propositions.

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APPENDIX

Love Before Breakfast

I was still a young man when I came into the possession of an excellent estate. This consisted of a large country house, surrounded by lawns, groves, and gardens, and situated not far from the flourishing little town of Boynton. Being an orphan with no brothers or sisters, I set up here a bachelor's hall, in which, for two years, I lived with great satisfaction and comfort, improving my grounds and furnishing my house. When I had made all the improvements which were really needed, and feeling that I now had a most delightful home to come back to, I thought it would be an excellent thing to take a trip to Europe, give my mind a run in fresh fields, and pick up a lot of bric-abrac and ideas for the adornment and advantage of my house and mind.

It was the custom of the residents in my neighborhood who owned houses and travelled in the summer to let their houses during their absence, and my business agent and myself agreed that this would be an excellent thing for me to do. If the house were let to a suitable family it would yield me a considerable income, and the place would not present on my return that air of retrogression and desolation which I might expect if it were left unoccupied and in charge of a caretaker.

My agent assured me that I would have no trouble whatever in letting my place, for it offered many advantages and I expected but a reasonable rent. I desired to leave everything just as it stood, house, furniture, books, horses, cows, and poultry, taking with me only my clothes and personal requisites, and I desired tenants who would come in bringing only their clothes and personal requisites, which they could quietly take away with them when their lease should expire and I should return home.

In spite, however, of the assurances of the agent, it was not easy to let my place. The house was too large for some people, too small for others, and while some applicants had more horses than I had stalls in my stable, others did not want even the horses I would leave. I had engaged my steamer passage, and the day for my departure drew near, and yet no suitable tenants had presented themselves. I had almost come to the conclusion that the whole matter would have to be left in the hands of my agent, for I had no intention whatever of giving up my projected travels, when early one afternoon some people came to look at the house. Fortunately I was at home, and I gave myself the pleasure of personally conducting them about the premises. It was a pleasure, because as soon as I comprehended the fact that these applicants desired to rent my house I wished them to have it.

The family consisted of an elderly gentleman and his wife, with a daughter of twenty or thereabout. This was a family that suited me exactly. Three in number, no children, people of intelligence and position, fond of the country, and anxious for just such a place as I offered them--what could be better?

The more I walked about and talked with these good people and showed them my possessions, the more I desired that the young lady should take my house. Of course her parents were included in this wish, but it was for her ears that all my remarks were intended, although sometimes addressed to the others, and she was the tenant I labored to obtain. I say "labored" advisedly, because I racked my brain to think of inducements which might bring them to a speedy and favorable decision.

I left them in my library to talk the matter over by themselves, and in less than ten minutes the young lady herself came out on the lawn to tell me that her father and mother had decided to take the place and would like to speak with me.

"I am so glad," she said as we went in. "I am sure I shall enjoy every hour of our stay here. It is so different from anything we have yet seen."

Her name was Vincent--Cora Vincent, as I discovered from her mother's remarks.

As soon as they departed I had my mare saddled and rode into town to see my agent. I went into his office exultant.

"I've let my house," I said, "and I want you to make out the lease and have everything fixed and settled as soon as possible. This is the address of my tenants."

The agent asked me a good many questions, being particularly anxious to know what rent had been agreed upon.

"Heavens!" he exclaimed, when I mentioned the sum, "that is ever so much less than I told you you could get. I am in communication now with a party whom I know would pay you considerably more than these people. Have you definitely settled with them? Perhaps it is not too late to withdraw."

"Withdraw!" I cried. "Never! They are the only tenants I want. I was determined to get them, and I think I must have lowered the rent four or five times in the course of the afternoon. I took a big slice out of it before I mentioned the sum at all. You see," said I, very impressively, "these Vincents exactly suit me." And then I went on to state fully the advantages of the arrangement, omitting, however, any references to my visions of Miss Vincent swinging in my hammocks or musing in my study-chair.

Happening to be in New York one day, I went to the Vincents' city residence to consult with them in regard to some awnings which I proposed putting up at the back of the house. I found no one at home but the old gentleman, and it made no difference to him whether the awnings were black and brown or red and yellow. I cordially invited him to come out before I left, and bring his family, that they might look about the place to see if there was anything they would like to have done which had not already been attended to.

I mentioned this matter to my agent, suggesting that if he happened to be in New York he might call on the Vincents and repeat my invitation. It was not likely that the old gentleman would remember to mention it to his wife and daughter, and it was really important that everything should be made satisfactory before I left.

"It seems to me," he said, smiling a little grimly, "that the Vincents had better be kept away from your house until you have gone. If you do anything more to it you may find out that it would have been more profitable to have shut it up while you are away."

He did call, however, partly because I wished him to and partly because he was curious to see the people I was so anxious to install in my home, and to whom he was to be my legal representative. He reported the next day that he had found no one at home but Miss Vincent, and that she had said that she and her mother would be very glad to come out the next week and go over the place before they took possession.

"Next week!" I exclaimed. "I shall be gone then!"

"But I shall be here," said Mr. Barker, "and I'll show them about and take their suggestions."

This did not suit me at all. It annoyed me very much to think of Barker showing Miss Vincent about my place. He was a good-looking young man and not at all backward in his manners.

"After all," said I, "I suppose that everything that ought to be done has been done. I hope you told her that."

"Of course not," said he. "That would have been running dead against your orders. Besides, it's my business to show people about places. I don't mind it."

"Barker," said I, a little later, "there will be no use of your going every month to the Vincents to collect their rent. I shall write to Mr. Vincent to pay as he pleases. He can send a check monthly or at the end of the season, as it may be convenient. He is perfectly responsible, and I would much prefer to have the money in a lump when I come back."

Barker grinned. "All right," said he, "but that's not the way to do business, you know."

On the day before that on which I was to sail, my mind was in such a disturbed condition that I could not attend to my packing or anything else. It almost enraged me to think that I was deliberately leaving the country ten days before my tenants would come to my house. There was no reason why I should do this. There were many reasons why I should not. There was Barker. I was now of the

opinion that he would personally superintend the removal of the Vincents and their establishment to my home. I remembered that the only suggestion he had made about the improvement of the place had been the construction of a tennis court. I knew that he was a champion player. Confound it! What a dreadful mistake I had made in selecting such a man for my house-agent. With my mind's eye I could already see Miss Vincent and Barker selecting a spot for tennis and planning the arrangements of the court.

I took the first train to New York and went directly to the steamboat office. It is astonishing how many obstacles can be removed from a man's path if he will make up his mind to give them a good kick. I found that my steamer was crowded. The applications for passage exceeded the accommodations, and the agent was delighted to transfer me to the steamer that sailed on June 3. I went home exultant. Barker drove over in the evening to take his last instructions, and a blank look came over his face when I told him that business had delayed my departure, and that I should not sail the next day. If I had told him that part of that business was the laying out of a tennis-court he might have looked blanker.

The next day I went to Miss Vincent's house with a plan of the grounds, and she and I talked it over until the matter was settled. It was necessary to be prompt about this, I explained, as there would be a great deal of levelling and rolling to be done.

I also had a talk with the old gentleman about books. There were several large boxes of my books in New York which I had never sent out to my country house. Many of these I thought might be interesting to him, and I offered to have them taken out and left at his disposal. What a grand idea was this! I had been internally groaning because I could think of no possible pretence, for further interviews with Miss Vincent, and here was something better than I could have imagined. Her father declared that he could not put me to so much trouble, but I would listen to none of his words, and the next morning my books were spread over his library floor.

The selection and cataloguing of the volumes desired occupied the mornings of three days. The old gentleman's part was soon done, but there were many things in the books which were far more interesting to me than their titles, and to which I desired to draw Miss Vincent's attention. All this greatly protracted our labors. She was not only a beautiful girl, but her intelligence and intellectual grasp were wonderful. I could not help telling her what a great pleasure it would be to me to think, while wandering in foreign lands, that such an appreciative family would be enjoying my books and my place.

"You are so fond of your house and everything you have," said she, "that we shall almost feel as if we were depriving you of your rights. But I suppose that Italian lakes and the Alps will make you forget for a time even your beautiful home."

"Not if you are in it," I longed to say, but I restrained myself. I did not believe that it was possible for me to be more in love with this girl than I was at that moment, but, of course, it would be the rankest stupidity to tell her so. To her I was simply her father's landlord.

I went to that house the next day to see that the boxes were properly repacked, and I actually went the next day to see if the right boxes had gone into the country, and the others back to the storehouse. The first day I saw only the father. The second day it was the mother who assured me that everything had been properly attended to. I began to feel that if I did not wish a decided rebuff I would better not make any more pretences of business at the Vincent house.

There were affairs of my own which should have been attended to, and I ought to have gone home and attended to them, but I could not bear to do so. There was no reason to suppose she would go out there before the first of June.

Thinking over the matter many times, I came to the conclusion that if I could see her once more I would be satisfied. To obtain this final interview there was but one way. I had left my house on Saturday, the Vincents would come on the following Monday, and I would sail on Wednesday. I would go on Tuesday to inquire if they found everything to their satisfaction. This would be a very proper attention from a landlord about to leave the country.

Every morning, soon after break of day, I went to my home and wandered about my grounds. If it rained I did not mind that. I like a summer rain.

But I knew I must not revel in this place too long. I was on the point of rising to leave when I heard approaching footsteps. My breath stopped. Was I at last to be discovered? This was what came of my reckless security. But perhaps the person, some workman most likely, would pass without noticing me. To remain quiet seemed the best course, and I lay motionless.

But the person approaching turned into the little pathway. The footsteps came nearer. I sprang from the hammock. Before me was Miss Vincent!

What was my aspect I know not, but I have no doubt I turned fiery red. She stopped suddenly, but she did not turn red.

"Oh, Mr. Ripley," she exclaimed, "good morning! You must excuse me. I did not know--"

That she should have had sufficient self-possession to say good morning amazed me. Her whole appearance, in fact, amazed me. There seemed to be something wanting in her manner. I endeavored to get myself into condition.

"You must be surprised," I said, "to see me here. You supposed I was in Europe, but--"

As I spoke I made a couple of steps toward her, but suddenly stopped. One of my coat buttons had caught in the meshes of the hammock. It was confoundedly awkward. I tried to loosen the button, but it was badly entangled. Then I desperately pulled at it to tear it off.

"Oh, don't do that," she said. "Let me unfasten it for you." And taking the threads of the hammock in one of her little hands and the button in the other, she quickly separated them. "I should think buttons would be very inconvenient things--at least, in hammocks," she said smiling. "You see, girls don't have any such trouble."

I could not understand her manner. She seemed to take my being there as a matter of course.

"I must beg a thousand pardons for this--this trespass," I said.

"Trespass!" said she, with a smile. "People don't trespass on their own land--"

"But it is not my land," said I. "It is your father's for the time being. I have no right here whatever. I do not know how to explain, but you must think it very strange to find me here when you supposed I had started for Europe."

"Oh! I knew you had not started for Europe," said she, "because I have seen you working in the grounds--"

"Seen me!" I interrupted. "Is it possible?"

"Oh, yes," said she. "I don't know how long you had been coming when I first saw you, but when I found that fresh bed of pinks all transplanted from somewhere, and just as lovely as they could be, instead of the old ones, I spoke to the man; but he did not know anything about it, and said he had not had time to do anything to the flowers, whereas I had been giving him credit for ever so much weeding and cleaning up. Then I supposed that Mr. Barker, who is just as kind and attentive as he can be, had done it; but I could hardly believe he was the sort of man to come early in the morning and work out of doors,"--("Oh, how I wish he had come!" I thought. "If I had caught him here working among the flowers!"),--"and when he came that afternoon to play tennis I found that he had been away for two days, and could not have planted the pinks. So I simply got up early one morning and looked out, and there I saw you, with your coat off, working just as hard as ever you could."

I stepped back, my mind for a moment a perfect blank.

"What could you have thought of me?" I exclaimed presently.

"Really, at first I did not know what to think," said she. "Of course I did not know what had detained you in this country, but I remembered that I had heard that you were a very particular person about your flowers and shrubs and grounds, and that most likely you thought they would be better taken care of if you kept an eye on them, and that when you found there was so much to do you just went to work and did it. I did not speak of this to anybody, because if you did not wish it to be known that you were taking care of the grounds it was not my business to tell people about it. But yesterday, when I found this place where I had hung my hammock so beautifully cleared up and made so nice and clean and pleasant in every way, I thought I must come down to tell you how much obliged I am,

and also that you ought not to take so much trouble for us. If you think the grounds need more attention, I will persuade my father to hire another man, now and then, to work about the place. Really, Mr. Ripley, you ought not to have to--"

I was humbled, abashed. She had seen me at my morning devotions, and this was the way she interpreted them. She considered me an overnice fellow who was so desperately afraid his place would be injured that he came sneaking around every morning to see if any damage had been done and to put things to rights.

She stood for a moment as if expecting me to speak, brushed a buzzing fly from her sleeve, and then, looking at me with a gentle smile, she turned a little as if she were about to leave.

I could not let her go without telling her something. Her present opinion of me must not rest in her mind another minute. And yet, what story could I devise? How, indeed, could I devise anything with which to deceive a girl who spoke and looked at me as this girl did? I could not do it. I must rush away speechless and never see her again, or I must tell her all. I came a little nearer to her.

"Miss Vincent," said I, "you do not understand at all why I am here--why I have been here so much--why I did not go to Europe. The truth is, I could not leave. I do not wish to be away; I want to come here and live here always--"

"Oh, dear! " she interrupted, "of course it is natural that you should not want to tear yourself away from your lovely home. It would be very hard for us to go away now, especially for father and me, for we have grown to love this place so much. But if you want us to leave, I dare say--"

"I want you to leave!" I exclaimed. "Never! When I say that I want to live here myself, that my heart will not let me go anywhere else, I mean that I want you to live here too--you, your mother and father--that I want--"

"Oh, that would be perfectly splendid!" she said. "I have ever so often thought that it was a shame that you should be deprived of the pleasures you so much enjoy, which I see you can find here and nowhere else. Now, I have a plan which I think will work splendidly. We are a very small family. Why shouldn't you come here and live with us? There is plenty of room, and I know father and mother would be very glad, and you can pay your board, if that would please you better.."

The tower and the room under it! For me! What a contemptibly little-minded and insignificant person she must think me. The words with which I strove to tell her that I wished to live here as lord, with her as my queen, would not come. She looked at me for a moment as I stood on the brink of saying something but not saying it, and then she turned suddenly toward the hammock.

"Did you see anything of a fan I left here?" she said. "I know I left it here, but when I came yesterday it was gone. Perhaps you may have noticed it somewhere--"

Now, the morning before, I had taken that fan home with me. It was an awkward thing to carry, but I had concealed it under my coat. It was a contemptible trick, but the fan had her initials on it, and as it was the only thing belonging to her of which I could possess myself, the temptation had been too great to resist. As she stood waiting for my answer there was a light in her eye which illuminated my perceptions.

"Did you see me take that fan?" I asked.

"I did," said she.

"Then you know," I exclaimed, stepping nearer to her, "why it is I did not leave this country as I intended, why it was impossible for me to tear myself away from this house, why it is that I have been here every morning, hovering around and doing the things I have been doing?"

She looked up at me, and with her eyes she said, "How could I help knowing?" She might have intended to say something with her lips, but I took my answer from her eyes, and with the quick impulse of a lover I stopped her speech.

"You have strange ways," she said presently, blushing and gently pressing back my arm. "I haven't told you a thing."

"Let us tell each other everything now," I cried, and we seated ourselves in the hammock.

It was a quarter of an hour later and we were still sitting together in the hammock.

"You may think," said she, "that, knowing what I did, it was very queer for me to come out to you this morning, but I could not help it. You were getting dreadfully careless, and were staying so late and doing things which people would have been bound to notice, especially as father is always talking about our enjoying the fresh hours of the morning, that I felt I could not let you go on any longer. And when it came to that fan business I saw plainly that you must either immediately start for Europe or--"

"Or what?" I interrupted.

"Or go to my father and regularly engage yourself as a--"

I do not know whether she was going to say "gardener" or not, but it did not matter. I stopped her.

It was perhaps twenty minutes later, and we were standing together at the edge of the woods. She wanted me to come to the house to take breakfast with them.

"Oh, I could not do that!" I said. "They would be so surprised. I should have so much to explain before I could even begin to state my case."

"Well, then, explain," said she. "You will find father on the front piazza. He is always there before breakfast, and there is plenty of time. After all that has been said here, I cannot go to breakfast and look commonplace while you run away."

"But suppose your father objects?" said I.

"Well, then you will have to go back and take breakfast with your miller," said she.

I never saw a family so little affected by surprises as those Vincents. When I appeared on the front piazza the old gentleman did not jump. He shook hands with me and asked me to sit down, and when I told him everything he did not even ejaculate, but simply folded his hands together and looked out over the railing.

"It seemed strange to Mrs. Vincent and myself," he said, "when we first noticed your extraordinary attachment for our daughter, but, after all, it was natural enough."

"Noticed it!" I exclaimed. "When did you do that?"

"Very soon," he said. "When you and Cora were cataloguing the books at my house in town I noticed it and spoke to Mrs. Vincent, but she said it was nothing new to her, for it was plain enough on the day when we first met you here that you were letting the house to Cora, and that she had not spoken of it to me because she was afraid I might think it wrong to accept the favorable and unusual arrangements you were making with us if I suspected the reason for them--"

"Barker!" I cried. "The scoundrel!"

"You are mistaken, sir," said Mr. Vincent. "He spoke with the greatest kindness of you, and said that as it was evident you had your own reasons for wishing to stay in the neighborhood, and did not wish the fact to be known, he had spoken of it to no one but me, and he would not have done this had he not thought it would prevent embarrassment in case we should meet."

Would that everlasting Barker ever cease meddling in my affairs?

"Do you suppose," I asked, "that he imagined the reason for my staying here?"

"I do not know," said the old gentleman, "but after the questions I put to him I have no doubt he suspected it. I made many inquiries of him regarding you, your family, habits, and disposition, for this was a very vital matter to me, sir, and I am happy to inform you that he said nothing of you that was not good, so I urged him to keep the matter to himself. I determined, however, that if you continued your morning visits I should take an early opportunity of accosting you and asking an explanation."

"And you never mentioned anything of this to your daughter?" said I.

"Oh, no," he answered. "We carefully kept everything from her."

"But, my dear sir," said I, rising, "you have given me no answer."

You have not told me whether or not you will accept me as a son-in-law."

He smiled. "Truly," he said, "I have not answered you; but the fact is, Mrs. Vincent and I have considered the matter so long, and having come to the conclusion that if you made an honorable and

straightforward proposition, and if Cora were willing to accept you, we could see no reason to object to--"

At this moment the front door opened and Cora appeared.

"Are you going to stay to breakfast?" she asked. "Because, if you are, it is ready."

I stayed to breakfast.

I am now living in my own house, not in the two tower rooms, but in the whole mansion, of which my former tenant, Cora, is now mistress supreme. Mr. and Mrs. Vincent expect to spend the next summer here and take care of the house while we are travelling.

Mr. Barker, an excellent fellow and a most thorough business man, still manages my affairs, and there is nothing on the place that flourishes so vigorously as the bed of pinks which I got from the miller's wife.

By the way, when I went back to my lodging on that eventful day, the miller's wife met me at the door.

"I kept your breakfast waitin' for you for a good while," said she, "but as you didn't come, I supposed you were takin' breakfast in your own house, and I cleared it away."

"Do you know who I am?" I exclaimed.

"Oh, yes, sir," she said. "We did not at first, but when everybody began to talk about it we couldn't help knowin' it."

"Everybody!" I gasped. "And may I ask what you and everybody said about me?"

"I think it was the general opinion, sir," said she, "that you were suspicious of them tenants of yours, and nobody wondered at it, for when city people gets into the country and on other people's property, there's no trustin' them out of your sight for a minute."

I could not let the good woman hold this opinion of my tenants, and I briefly told her the truth. She looked at me with moist admiration in her eyes.

"I am glad to hear that, sir," said she. "I like it very much. But if I was you I wouldn't be in a hurry to tell my husband and the people in the neighborhood about it. They might be a little disappointed at first, for they had a mighty high opinion of you when they thought that you was layin' low here to keep an eye on them tenants of yours."